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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE VIEW 
FROM COMPETITION POLICY 
Shubha Ghosh* 
Three propositions inform the debate over the relationship between in-
tellectual property rights and competition policy.  The first involves con-
cerns over how the anticompetitive uses of intellectual property will 
increase as intellectual property rights become stronger.  The second is that 
the uses of competition norms to loosen intellectual property rights will di-
minish the incentives for innovation.  Finally, there is the belief that the ten-
sion between competition policy and intellectual property rights can be 
reconciled by recognizing how market competition is consistent with inno-
vation and by acknowledging the competition norms that shape the scope of 
intellectual property rights.  In this Essay, I examine these three proposi-
tions and their application to the preliminary report on the pharmaceutical 
industry released by the European Commission on November 28, 2008.1 
I. SCRUTINIZING THREE PROPOSITIONS 
The first proposition—that anticompetitive uses of intellectual property 
will increase as intellectual property rights become stronger—should not be 
read as an anti intellectual property comment.  The quantity of rhetoric that 
is critical of intellectual property rights is unfortunate, as is the view that 
competition law, particularly United States antitrust law, is antithetical to 
the goals of intellectual property.  Nonetheless, as intellectual property 
rights grow stronger through legislative changes and judicial interpretations, 
the opportunity for abusing the right to exclude, through licensing and other 
practices, does increase.  In addition, stronger intellectual property protec-
tions can lead to market concentration as firms become able to realize econ-
omies of scale and scope through the exercise of intellectual property rights.  
Increased market concentration invites increased scrutiny from competition 
policymakers. 
The second proposition—that the uses of competition norms to loosen 
intellectual property rights will diminish the incentives for innovation—is a 
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tual property rights.  If one accepts the claim that intellectual property rights 
create incentives for innovation, then weaker intellectual property rights 
logically should reduce incentives to innovate.  The problem, however, is 
that there is no simple linear relationship between intellectual property 
rights and innovation.  Cumulative and serial innovation can be hampered 
by strong intellectual property rights.2  Furthermore, strong rights can create 
entrenched business models that are often difficult to displace through busi-
ness and technological innovation.3 
Nonetheless, the second proposition is worth bearing in mind.  First, it 
is an argument that needs to be confronted as competition policy more ag-
gressively challenges intellectual property rights.  Second, even without a 
simple linear relationship between the strength of intellectual property 
rights and innovation incentives, there is the concern that policymakers fix-
ated on competition may be overly aggressive and lose sight of how compe-
tition policy affects innovation markets.  The experience in the United 
States with IBM in the 1970s is an example of how competition policy can 
lose its focus in ensuring that markets remain dynamically competitive.4 
The third proposition—the idea that the tension between competition 
policy and intellectual property rights can be reconciled by recognizing how 
market competition is consistent with innovation and by acknowledging the 
competition norms that shape the scope of intellectual property rights—
synthesizes the tensions described in the first two.  Reconciling intellectual 
property and competition policy requires recognizing that intellectual prop-
erty law is a form of competition policy.5  The arguments for recognizing 
intellectual property as a type of competition policy extend beyond market 
competition and include rivalries between competing artists or between 
nonprofit entities, such as universities.6  However, if the focus is on the con-
text of market competition, which is the primary concern of competition 
policy, then we see that intellectual property rights shape the structure of 
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First, intellectual property rights resolve market failures that arise in in-
formation-based transactions.7  In any market transaction requiring the 
transfer of information, either by itself or in addition to an exchange of a 
product or service, parties to the transaction face two types of potential 
market failures.  The first type of failure is the appropriation problem, 
created by positive externalities that arise from the actual information itself.  
The second is the revelation problem, generated by the lack of incentives to 
reveal the information unless the party receiving the information will pay 
consideration for it.  Intellectual property rights solve both of these prob-
lems by creating a right to exclude others from using or distributing the in-
formation.  This right to exclude enables the owner of the intellectual 
property to appropriate enough return to develop and distribute the informa-
tion.  The exclusion right also allows the owner to reveal the information, 
with protections of legal recourse, should the information be misappro-
priated.  By resolving these market failures, intellectual property rights pro-
tect owners in the context of competitive markets, which in turn promotes 
the dissemination of socially valuable information. 
The second effect intellectual property rights have on market competi-
tion is also a by-product of the right to exclude.  The right to exclude, in the 
context of a competitive market, can serve as a legal barrier to entry for new 
products, technologies, and business methods.  Too broad a construction of 
intellectual property rights can hinder the very markets that are made possi-
ble by the rights.8  Therefore, it is important to construe intellectual property 
rights narrowly so that they do not interfere with either dynamic entry into, 
or required exit from, the markets.  This requires defining intellectual prop-
erty rights in a way that is consistent with a dynamic market environment 
and necessary for healthy innovation. 
Scrutinizing the three propositions closely yields an important conclu-
sion: intellectual property is about competition policy.  Innovation occurs 
through competition, and intellectual property rights ensure effective, dy-
namic competition.  This is why intellectual property rights must be defined 
in a way that is consistent with dynamic market competition.  If constructed 
too strongly, intellectual property rights can interfere with competition.  If 
constructed too weakly, intellectual property rights may not adequately re-
solve the market failures that bedevil markets for information.  The chal-
lenge is to design rules both within intellectual property law (the 
substantive law of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets) and 
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dynamic competitive markets.  To this end, the recent preliminary report on 
pharmaceuticals from the European Commission provides a useful lesson.9 
II. LESSONS FROM PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET POLICY 
At the outset, reconciliation of intellectual property and competition 
law may seem facile.  If the answer were so simple, why is the controversy 
often so heated?  The answer lies in the conflicting visions of competition 
that underlie competition law on the one hand and intellectual property law 
on the other.  Competition law, particularly United States antitrust law, un-
derstands market competition as competition based on price and among 
small sized firms.10  Intellectual property law, by contrast, often involves 
competition among large or mid-sized firms and operates on variables other 
than price, such as quality.11  The tension between these two bodies of law 
does not rest on a commitment to norms of competition but on how compe-
tition operates in practice.  Debates over pharmaceutical markets demon-
strate this conflict. 
Arguments in favor of strong pharmaceutical patents echo natural mo-
nopoly arguments for regulation.12  The high fixed costs of pharmaceutical 
research and development and the low marginal cost of producing a phar-
maceutical compound, once discovered, combine to create a firm level cost 
structure that requires developing pharmaceutical companies to recoup costs 
of production through some form of regulation.13  The exclusivity of strong 
patent rights allows a firm to recoup its costs through above marginal cost 
pricing for a pharmaceutical compound.  The economic rents that are rea-
lized through this pricing strategy permit the firm to recoup the fixed cost of 
its research and development investment and to stave off the effects of de-
structive competition that would drive price to the negligible marginal cost 
of production. 
Critics of strong pharmaceutical patents also typically invoke prin-
ciples of natural monopoly theory.  Often, distributional or equity argu-
ments are used to advocate a weakening of patent rights.  In addition, the 
moral hazard of gold plating, or raising costs of production, is asserted in 
response to the arguments in favor of strong patents.  Advocates for weaker 
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owners have incentive to ratchet up patent protection at the expense of 
access and competition in the marketplace.14  Put another way: if patents in 
the pharmaceutical industry represent a type of natural monopoly regula-
tion, then patent law needs to be deregulated through various political and 
market mechanisms. 
The problem with these well-worn arguments is that the positions are 
irreconcilable.  Patents are either too weak or too strong.  If the goal is one 
of moderation, the natural monopoly-based debate does not provide much 
guidance on how to effectively design patent rights.  The focus should be 
on creating an innovative and dynamic market for pharmaceuticals while 
recognizing that rules are necessary for this marketplace.  When the prob-
lem is understood in this way, the Preliminary Report from the European 
Commission offers much hope for how competition policy can inform intel-
lectual property law. 
The Report, extending over 400 pages, begins with a simple and note-
worthy observation: from 2000–2007, aggregate expenditure on pharma-
ceuticals among the 17 member countries would have been €14 billion 
higher without generic competition; without the impediments to generic en-
try, the report estimates that the savings could have been €3 billion more.15 
Four impediments affect the market for pharmaceutical products.  
Three of them affect the market for generics, and the fourth, the market for 
the originating pharmaceutical.  The first impediment involves originating 
pharmaceutical companies allegedly pursuing patent clusters, or multiple 
patenting over variations of the pharmaceutical compound.16  This patent 
cluster (or patent thicket, as it is also called) makes it difficult for generic 
companies to enter the market for the pharmaceutical.  The cluster creates a 
minefield of legal rights that the potential entrant must negotiate.17  These 
legal rights bring about the second impediment: patent litigation started by 
the originating company, leading to settlements which delay the market en-
try of generic firms.18  In addition to potential and actual litigation, the third 
barrier for generic drugs consists of regulatory hurdles, such as drug ap-
proval and the approval process for reimbursements from nation state health 
plans.19  Finally, the report finds that originating drug companies engage in 
a pervasive practice of defensive patenting, that is, obtaining patents solely 
to block a competitor from being able to market a potentially competing 
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strategy of patenting designed to extend the revenue stream of existing 
compounds.21 
The comparison with the market for generics in the United States is 
striking.  According to the report, drug prices in Europe drop by about 25% 
below the price of a branded drug as generics begin to enter, and by about 
40% within a year of entry.22  By contrast, prices in the United States often 
drop by about 80% within a year of entry.23  This difference suggests more 
aggressive competition in the United States, made possible by the structure 
of regulation and intellectual property rights to promote competition.  The 
contrast in pricing suggests that there may be anticompetitive behavior 
among generic firms.  In addition to addressing the four impediments noted 
in the report, aggressive investigation of generic firms is required.24 
Policy recommendations addressing impediments to generic competi-
tion illustrate how competition policy norms inform the structure of intel-
lectual property rights.  The report focuses on three institutional changes, 
one addressing bottlenecks to pharmaceutical regulation, and two dealing 
with patent reform.  The patent-related reforms are relevant to this Essay.  
Addressing the complexity created by multiple patent laws among the 
member states of the European Union, the report recommends creating a 
single European-wide patent system and a single unified judiciary specializ-
ing in patent law,25 presumably modeled on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit.  Both originating and generic pharmaceutical compa-
nies support these measures as means of simplifying and streamlining the 
patent process,26 but perhaps also as a way to preempt more aggressive 
competition law remedies.  These structural changes are important consid-
erations and may address the complexity created by patent clusters.  There 
are, however, two important caveats to these proposals and one critical 
reform that the report does not fully address. 
While a unified patent office and patent judiciary for the European Un-
ion have immediate appeal, they are insufficient unless accompanied by 
substantive reforms that introduce competition norms into the patent sys-
tem.  First, the proposed unified patent system needs to provide a fairly tho-
rough and aggressive means of policing patent applications to ensure that 
patents are granted to truly novel and inventive pharmaceutical compounds.  
Achieving this goal would require strong funding to provide a thorough 
compilation and review of the prior art, along with fairly aggressive scruti-
ny of patent applications, to avoid the creation of patent clusters.  The work 
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tuencies affected by the grant of a patent.  The use of post-grant, or even 
pre-grant, opposition would be desirable to provide additional scrutiny of 
patents and patent applications before they become the basis for anti-
competitive litigation. 
Second, a unified patent judiciary is a mixed-blessing.  Streamlining 
patent law development and enforcement has obvious benefits, but these 
benefits may come at the expense of creating an entrenched court that has 
its own infighting and agenda.  The United States experience with the Fed-
eral Circuit is demonstrative.  Its success is in part due to the caliber of 
many of the judges on the bench and the fact that the United States Su-
preme Court provides some oversight (the importance of which was dem-
onstrated by the Festo27 decision in 2002 and the eBay28 and Independent 
Ink29 decisions in 2006).  The concerns with the Federal Circuit arise from 
the inability of expertise to resolve fundamental questions about patent law, 
such as claim construction and the nonobviousness doctrine.30  The last two 
matters may remain unresolved through expertise, and may require more 
aggressive legislative action.  Finally, the Federal Circuit has not been sup-
portive of competition policy norms in patent law, as its 2000 decision in 
the Xerox litigation illustrates.31  The court’s position may be the result of 
creating a specialized court whose ostensible job is to protect patents.  A 
specialized court may be the institutional basis for strengthening patent 
rights, rather than using patent rights as an instrument for creating dynamic, 
innovative, and competitive markets. 
One important substantive change for any unified patent judiciary is 
greater scrutiny of injunctive relief.  In 2006, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.32 that a patent injunction 
is a discretionary, and not a mandatory, remedy.33  This ruling put the Unit-
ed States at odds with all other patent jurisdictions.  The Preliminary Report 
indicates that over the 2000–2007 period, injunctive relief was granted in 
just under half the litigated cases.  While this result is consistent with civil 
litigation models showing a fifty-fifty split in the success rate for plaintiffs, 
if the Commission is correct about patent litigation being a serious impedi-
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that injunctive relief should be discretionary, particularly in the area of 
pharmaceuticals. 
The debate in the United States, over the exercise of judicial discretion 
in the context of patent injunctions, is revealing.  The Federal Circuit’s de-
cision in eBay held that patent injunctions should be granted in all but ex-
traordinary circumstances.  The health concerns raised by pharmaceuticals 
would satisfy the narrow exception proposed by the Federal Circuit.  The 
Supreme Court, in expanding judicial discretion, split three ways over how 
that discretion should be exercised when granting injunctive relief for patent 
infringement.  The majority opinion urged courts to follow the traditional 
four-factor approach (irreparable injury, adequacy of legal remedies, ba-
lancing of hardships, and public interest),34 while the concurrence by Chief 
Justice Roberts cautioned that the traditional four-factor test should be ap-
plied in light of judicial precedent on patent injunctions.35  The concurrence 
by Justice Kennedy, citing the 2004 Federal Trade Commission report on 
anticompetitive uses of patents, emphasized that judicial discretion should 
consider the potential anticompetitive uses of the patent injunction.36  As the 
Commission builds on its Preliminary Report in fashioning patent reform 
policy, the U.S. experience with injunctive relief offers an important model 
for how to address the anticompetitive uses of patent litigation.  Denying 
patent injunctions in the context of anticompetitive litigation would be a 
linchpin of broader policies dealing with anticompetitive settlements. 
CONCLUSION 
The Preliminary Report is an important document that signals further 
enforcement activity in the pharmaceutical industry.  As the Report is de-
veloped and implemented, the authors should remain mindful that competi-
tion policy informs not only formal competition law, but also the doctrine 
and practice of intellectual property law.  Although this Essay touches only 
on a few salient points, it clearly shows the case for designing patent rights 
specifically—and intellectual property rights generally—as tools to foster a 
dynamic competitive market.  Whether competition is fostered through 
competition law or the design of intellectual property rights, it is the prom-
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